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ABSTRACT
Masquerade Detection on Mobile Devices
by Swathi Nambiar Kadala Manikoth
A masquerade is an attack where the attacker avoids detection by impersonating
an authorized user of a system. In this research we consider the problem of masquerade
detection on mobile devices. Our goal is to improve on previous work by considering
more features and a wide variety of machine learning techniques. Our approach consists
of verifying the authenticity of users based on individual features and combinations of
features for all users to determine which features contribute the most to masquerade
detection. Also, we determine which of the two approaches - the combination of
features or using individual features has performed better.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
A masquerade is an attack where the attacker avoids detection by impersonating
an authorized user of a system and at times tries to gain greater privileges than they
are authorized for [1]. A study conducted in the Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS) in 2014 unconcealed that 57% of smartphone owners don’t lock their
devices when they leave them unattended [2]. This opens opportunities for malicious
intruders to gain access to the devices and highlights the requirement for sturdy
mechanisms to forestall unauthorized access. An application can also gain access to
the resources on the phone that it is not supposed to access. These applications gain
access to the phone and simulate the phone usage of a user. So, if there is any Intrusion
detection mechanism running on the system, it would assume that the phone is being
used by the authorized user. Not certainly enough but the mechanism could, in such
a case verify the authenticity of the usage by performing a behavior analysis check. It
is certain that malware apps have undesirable behaviors but masquerading can even
make supposedly benign apps show unwanted characteristics. A few examples of the
kinds of malware which masquerade as an authorized user and that people welcome
when they install free applications are given below.
1. A mobile banking app called Zitmo (ZeuS in the mobile) listens to all incoming
SMS messages and forwards them to a remote server. What is more alarming
is that the one-time passwords that are sent by the bank as a step towards
secure 2-step authentication can also be broken by the malware attached to this
app [3].
2. There is an app that masqueraded users after tricking them into downloading it
thinking it is Google Plus [4].
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Figure 1: Rates of smartphone malware over several years
As a result of the rampant increase in the number of smartphone devices [5, 6],
intrusion detection on such devices is an important research problem. Figure 1 shows
the increasing rates of smartphone malware in the U.S.
A masquerade may be attempted basically through bypassing any kind of authen-
tication mechanism. It could be the use of stolen log on IDs or stolen/hacked passwords
and also through discovering security gaps in programs. These techniques could be
attempted by an insider in the organization or from an outside user. Masquerading
can be a severe threat to the security of computer systems and infrastructures [1].
Constructing practical detection systems masqueraders has been a challenge ever
since 1988 [8]. There are a few types of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that have
been used. A knowledge based or signature based IDS works by having a database
of previous profiles and known system vulnerabilities. It then compares any new
signature against the list but this does not work well with attacks that haven’t been
recorded. Another approach towards solving the problem of masquerade detection is
to find deviations from the normal user profiles. Behavior detection has become an
accepted means of detecting anomalous behavior [9].
There have been several approaches to improve security and privacy for mobile
devices. Firstly, a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or passwords are used [10].
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Nevertheless it is upto the user to make sure the passwords or PIN remain a se-
cret. Another approach used is behavior based active authentication. Continuous
authentication is a form of behavior based authentication wherein the users keystrokes
dynamics, gait recognition or touchscreen usage statistics are used to identify the
user [11]. All of these methods are vulnerable to privacy theft. With many malicious
applications and ways of masquerading coming up, there’s a need for there’s a need
for better dependable methods of access control that do not trust the users to do what
is required to ensure security. Machine learning is indeed an efficient in detecting
users based on usage behavior as can be seen in Chapter 2. This could be considered
as an active IDS or more commonly known as an Intrusion Prevention System that
is configured to automatically detect and block the suspected users. We will later
present a practical application architecture in this paper. Accuracy is important in
such cases because if the model results in too many false positives then the system
might end up denying access to authorized users. Imagine having a biometric based
authentication on the phone such as fingerprint verification. If the software on the
phone denies your fingerprint one fine day and does not unlock the phone when
your really need to do something important, it could get very annoying. Implicit
authentication based on behavior conjointly has potential as an auxiliary component
component in multi-factor authentication systems, when utilized with passwords or
different standard techniques [2].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses examples
of previous work done on intrusion detection and masquerade detection, including
the techniques used and results obtained in each case. Chapter 3 sheds light on the
dataset we used. It details out the various features being used and description of each
of them. We have also included details of feature engineering and the algorithms used
in or research. Chapter 4 is about the approach taken---in this chapter, we define the
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problem and propose a real time detection approach. Chapter 5 illustrates the various
stages mentioned in the approach in Chapter 4 in detail along with our experimental
results. Results for both user based and feature based data in terms of accuracies
and AUC, ROC curves are included in this chapter. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the
paper and suggests future work.
4
CHAPTER 2
Previous Work
Detecting masqueraders has long been a research topic [9], where a model is
built for a user’s behavior, and masqueraders are detected based on deviations from
normal user profiles. Mobile devices present some additional challenges for masquerade
detection. Relevant prior work has focused on the problem of masquerade detection
by adopting various approaches. Few papers have used system calls to establish
software behavior because system calls capture specific details of the applications
interaction with its underlying system [12, 13, 14]. One work [15] was based on
behavioral recognition system for portable handsets. The paper starts with extraction
of behavior signatures. The authors have created a malicious signature database in
view of a thorough audit of malware known to date. Since behavior signatures are
lesser and shorter than conventional payload signatures, the database is minimized
and can in this way be put on a handset. They executed the monitoring layer on the
Symbian emulator for run-time formation of signatures and utilized SVM to prepare
a classifier. They claim that the model identifies new malware which share certain
behavioral patterns with existing samples in the database. Another paper created a
new algorithm that uses pair-wise sequence alignment to indicate similarity between
sequences of commands [16]. Another paper considered sequences of user activity and
used their own clustering algorithms [17]. A platform called VetDroid was created
to vet out undesirable behaviors by analysis of permissions [18]. Some work has
been done on using neural networks to profile behaviors [19]. One paper especially
concentrates on the temporal pattern extraction from user behavior and demonstrates
that instead of considering sequential patterns only, it would be a better idea to
consider both temporal and sequential patters to develop efficient solutions for user
recognition [19].
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One recent paper [20] classified behaviors based on the top 10 applications used
by a legitimate user on the Android device. The influence factor of an app has been
calculated depending on how much the Mutual Information (MI) score of the original
dataset (MI(D)) varies in absence of the instances related to the app. MI is the amount
of information that an event contains about the occurrence of an other event. The
users mobile usage records are processed and records which contain the current target
app are removed iteratively, MI of the reduced dataset is calculated and compared to
its influence factor. Then the MI score is normalized and used for ranking the apps.
A few top apps are further processed to remove apps associated with less number of
instances in the dataset. 4 classifiers have been used to indicate EER and execution
time requirements for the dataset. Chi-square attribute evaluation had been used for
feature selection to enhance the results.Table 1 summarizes the previous work done
on masquerade detection.
Table 1: Examples of masquerade detection research
Author Feature Methods used Performance
Alzubaidi et al., 2017 Top 10 apps used IBK ; D.Table ;J48; Forest 9.04% EER
Lamba et al., 2017 Sequences of user activity Clustering 70.00% Accuracy
Maxion and Tahlia, 2002
Command name and user
using UNIX acc. auditing
mechanism
Naive Bayes 61.4 Cost
F.Li, N.L.Clarke and
M.Papadaki Mobile device activities Neural networks 35% EER
F.Li, N.L.Clarke and
M.Papadaki
Calling Activity - time and
duration
Feed-Forward Multi-
Layered Perceptron and
RBF Neural Network
1.3% EER
Samfat and Molva, 1997 Itinerary and Calls Mathematical Formula 82.5% Accuracy
Boukerche and Notare, 2002 Calls RBF Neural Network 97.5% Accuracy
Stormann, 1997 Calls Rule Based 99% Accuracy
Alves et al., 2006 Calls Distance-based and cluster-ing 91% Accuracy
Buschkeset al., 1998 Mobility Bayes decision rule 87.5% Accuracy
Sun et al., 2004 Mobility High order Markov 87.5% Accuracy
In Table 1,
1. EER is Equal Error Rate which is the difference between expected output and
generated output.
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2. Cost as a ranking function is
Cost = Misses+ 6× False Alarms (1)
3. The formula to calculate accuracy is
Accuracy =
TP+ TN
TP+ TN+ FP+ FN
(2)
where TP is the number of True Positives, TN is the True Negatives, FP is the
number of False Positives, and FN is the number of False Negatives.
One paper [21] in Table 1 described an approach that can be used to score
suspicious execution sequences that are generated during the users interaction with the
device. They proposed a likelihood-based statistic in order to score each user sequence
based on its suspiciousness. The contextual information of the system had been
exploited and a clustering technique was employed to cluster a users sequence to know
the chances of their occurrence and the score would indicate level of suspiciousness.
More precisely, score is inversely proportional to suspiciousness.
Another paper [22] talks about what makes a successful masquerader and attempts
to solve the problem of masquerade detection by classifying sequences of user-command
data into a legitimate user and the masquerader. A completely new detection algorithm
influenced by Naive Bayes text classification was used on the dataset which was formed
by randomly considering 50 user data as being legitimate user data and remaining 20
user data as masquerader data.
One of the papers [23] developed an Intusion Detection System (IDS) for mobile
devices. The authors extracted telephony based information from MIT Reality
Mining dataset [24] and applied Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron Neural
Network and Radial Basis Function Neural Network on the data. The data used
7
contained 2 sets - time of call, the duration and time of call, the duration and the
called number.
Paper [18] also used the MIT Reality Mining dataset [24] and built models for
the features individually. The features were user data like profiling calling, device
usage and Bluetooth network scanning data extracted from the dataset using neural
networks.
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CHAPTER 3
Overview of the dataset and algorithms
3.1 Dataset
We used the MIT Reality Mining dataset [24]. It consists of data collected from
around 100 mobile phone users (students and faculty of MIT) and has logs collected
from their devices over a period of 9 months between 2004 to 2005. The user’s phones
had a software preinstalled in their devices that would collect usage information and
relay the logs to a server every night or store the data on an internal memory card.
3.1.1 Data Exploration
The dataset contains below several features for 94 features. However, we chose
the below few features for our experiments. Each user in our dataset has the following
fields:
date Date on which information was collected
event Unique event ID
contact The contact ID in phone’s address book
description Short description of the communication medium
direction Direction of the description data
duration Duration in seconds
hashNum The hashed phone number of the other party
chargeTime Date and time the phone is charging or unplugged
charge whether the phone was charging (1) or unplugged (0)
activeTime Date and time the phone has been in use and not
active Whether the phone has been in use (1) and not in use (0)
logtimes Times when the logs were being written
onTime The total amount of time data was recorded (in days)
on Whether or not the phone is turned on or not
dateForLoc Date and time at which the person was at a particular location
areaID.cellID,all Area and cell ID of location of the person
all_locs The unique set of towers seen by the subject
loc_ids An indexed version of locs. Towers are replaced by a unique ID
device_macs The MAC addresses of Bluetooth devices discovered on each scan
(Converted to ints).
deviceDate The time/dates of each scan
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device_list_macs A list of all the devices Bluetooth MAC addresses seen by the
phone (converted from hex to int)
device_types The discovered Bluetooth device type (as determined by the stan-
dard Bluetooth protocol)
device_list_types1 A list of the device types discovered by the phone
device_list_types2 A list of the device types discovered by the phone
device_list_types3 A list of the device types discovered by the phone
cellname An array of areaID.cellID and the string the user named the
location
logTime Time at which the cellname was recorded
apps The time each application was started and the total number of
times the app was used
comm_voice_date The dates of the voice calls
comm_data The number of data sessions initiated on the phone
comm_data_date The times when the data sessions were started
3.1.2 Data Munging
We divided the data primarily into two forms to make best use of the data
available. One group consists of user based data. The user based data depicts the
values of various fields mentioned above for 94 users. This can help the model learn a
users complete behavior based on the users phone usage. The other group is feature
based data. This group depicts user data per field. But for this group, we have only
taken into account those fields that have data associated with sequence of time series.
There was some feature engineering done before using the data as input to the
various machine learning algorithms like handling null and out of range data. We filled
the missing values with mean values and in case of categorical variables, filled missing
values with most frequent (mode) values. All categorical variables were considered
as integers. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the way the values of date and description
are distributed,Table 3 and Table 4 have information on the various statistics like
10
Figure 2: Date feature statistics
the number of unique values, the minimum and maximum values, mean, median and
standard deviation of the values and the percentage of missing values that have been
replaced.
Example statistics of features:
Table 3: Feature : Date
Type Continous
Unique values 8945
Missing values 4.3223%
Min 732,029.60
Mean 732,227.38
Median 732,221.61
Std 40.79
Max 732,408.27
Table 4: Feature : Description
Type Categorical
Unique values 5
Missing values 2.5625%
The most frequent 3 7,570
The least frequent Data call 2
Another such change made to the dataset is to the fields involved with string
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Figure 3: Description Feature Statistics
data. We considered three fields which we thought were primarily important and
converted the string data in those fields into numerical data in order to create vectors
that can be passed as input to a few of the machine learning algorithms. The three
features are:
• Direction
• Description
• Apps
We found a list of 154 unique apps from a list of 261619 apps and substituted them
with unique values.
3.2 Algorithms used for Predictive Modeling
3.2.1 SVM
SVM is a supervised learning technique that finds a hyperplane that best separates
two classes of points as clusters with maximum margin. Margin here is the minimum
distance between the hyperplanes [10].The support vectors i.e the edge feature of
both clusters, compute the hyperplane using linear kernel function and by finding
weights (distance between the feature and hyperplane). Figure 4 shows the hyperplane,
support vectors and clusters separated using Linear kernel.
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Figure 4: Linear SVM
3.2.2 Fine KNN
KNN is an unsupervised learning technique used for clustering in which 𝐸𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑛
distance is found between each point and all other points and clusters are formed such
that the distance between two points inside a cluster is less than or equal to k (defined
by the user). So if we want to find similar samples, we can use KNN. But since KNN
determines neighborhood and is associated with a distance metric as discussed above,
all the features involved must be numeric. This is one reason why we converted a few
of the string features into numerical data by mapping each string against a unique
number and substituting them in the dataset. In our case, it would be interesting to
find groups of users who are similar to each other and fall into the same group and
group of dissimilar users fall into different groups.
Let us consider in our case the user whom we would like to authenticate as class
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1 and other users as class 0. We can build a Bayes decision boundary to show the
classification. When building a classification tree, at every node a question is asked
and eventually we get to a terminal node that gives the label i.e 0 or 1. The algorithm
decides which variables to ask questions of and build a fairly good decision boundary
that is good enough for classification. Our dataset is significantly huge and has various
types of variables but also includes missing values. Trees are good at handling big
datasets, they can handle continuous and categorical variables equally well and ignores
redundant variables. Trees can handle missing data elegantly.
3.2.3 Decision Tree
It is a supervised learning technique used for classification where a binary tree is
created based on decisions and decisions are made based on Gini coefficients in this
case. Decision tree predicts a class for an input vector thus in our case, decision trees
could be used to classify users based on their behavior data.
Figure 5: Image of a simple decision tree for App usage feature
We looked at the types of decision trees figure 6 and figured that a simple decision
tree would suit our data. Response variable is nothing but the label given to each row.
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Figure 6: A high level view of the types of decision trees available
In our case, we have 2 categories in our response variable which are 0 and 1. Thus,
we used a simple decision tree.
3.2.4 Extreme Gradient Boosting
Extreme Gradient Boosting(EGB) is generalized way of implementing ADAboost
and it can be used for basic classification. It implements the gradient boosting decision
tree algorithm. Boosting and Random Forests are ways of model averaging. The
primary idea of Boosting is to fit many large or small trees to re weighted versions of
the training data so it averages the tree by learning from errors in the previous trees.
It does the classification based on weighted majority vote. We take a random sample
15
of training data each time and build the tree, then we average the trees to bring the
variance down. It means that each tree will at any terminal node give an estimate of
the probability of being in a class. Finally, we average out the probabilities. So, the
final classifier is the weighted average of classifiers [25].
3.2.5 Random Forest
Random forests(RF) or Random Decision Forests are an ensemble learning method
for classification and regression like tasks. These algorithms typically function by
building a plenitude of decision trees during the training phase and then in case of
classification, they output mode of classes as compared to the mean prediction of
individual trees in case of regression. Random forest is a sort of boosting. If Random
forests should get the benefit of variance reduction by averaging then the trees
constructed should be completely correlated because correlation reduces the amount
by which we can reduce the variance. So de-correlating the trees by introducing
randomness while growing the tree is the solution. Each time we make a split, we take
a look at all the variables. Out of say 𝑃 variables, we are limited to 𝑛 variables to
search for the split point. Randomness in splitting de-correlates the trees and results
in a better reduction in variance by doing the averaging [25].
3.2.6 Regularized Greedy Forest
The training objective of Regularized Greedy Forest(RGF) is to minimize loss.
Mathematically, each node of the forest is associated with a decision rule which serves
as a basis function or atom for the additive model. Since exact optimum solution is
difficult to find we greedily select the basis function and optimize weights.
At a high level, the algorithmic framework for RGF consists of the following
components: Fix the weights, and change the structure of the forest (which changes
basis functions) in such a way that we achieve the least cost [26].
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CHAPTER 4
Approach
In this section, we consider a framework for masquerade detection. Say we want
to do masquerade detection for user A, then the framework should build a model
based on user A’s phone usage logs and when tested with user B or user C or any
other user should return low probability of being user A and when tested with user
A’s data should return a high probability of being user A.
Problem Statement: To detect legitimacy of the user of a mobile device based
on anomalies in usage behavior.
4.1 A potential application architecture
Confidentiality can be achieved using something you have, something you know
or something you are [10]. If an illegitimate user can break through this authentication
then there should be a system that can detect unauthorized usage based on behavior.
A deamon process or to be specific a service that collects logs could be running in
the phone. User can choose a time period over which the check should be performed.
The logs are sent to the remote server every night. During the time of check, the
server can pass the logs to the model and build user behavior. One advantage of this
method could be that the user behavior can change over time. For example the apps
used on the phone might not remain the same throughout the year. So, collecting
logs and building model for every check would work towards updating the model with
new usage characteristics. Thus saving false negatives. Moreover having logs sent
to a server that is located on the cloud will decentralize the computation from the
phone and keep the whole process independent of problems associated with memory
constraints. Once the model is built with data over a substantial period of time say 3
weeks, logs obtained could be used as test data against the built model. We can set a
threshold and whenever the result of testing the model i.e probability of user being
17
Figure 7: Architecture for a practical application
the authorized user is below the threshold value, server could notify the user over
email that is protected by code. Also, a history of usage results could be maintained
and provided to the user if required. If the user is notified, he or she could change
the password or find better ways to protect the device from being misused by an
unauthorized user.Also, as a security measure an authentication challenge could be
given to the user. Figure 7 shows an overview of the above discussed architecture.
Considering all features to build a model would only mean that the model
represents authorized users (not one particular user) but consider for example that
one of features was call/sms/call duration/apps used. If the model happens to classify
a particular user as being unauthorized because the app usage/ call pattern is different
from what the model was built with then it would conclude that user B is unauthorized
because he does not use the same apps/make the same calls like any other users whose
18
Figure 8: Diagram depicting the Pipeline
data was used to build the phone. Since all the data we have is valid user data, we
decided to go with the authentication problem. The pipeline mentioned on the cloud
in 7 can be found in 8.
4.2 Training model, Validating and testing the model
Usually,in order to perform supervised learning one will need two types of data
sets - one for training and one for testing. While performing machine learning we
train a model, validate the model and test the model. Figure 9 is a flowchart of the
process mentioned below.
1. In one dataset we have the input data with the expected output which is
either prepared manually or in an automated way, not necessarily completely
automated though. It is necessary to have the expected output for every data
row here. We train the model using this dataset.
2. The data we are going to test our model with. This is the data whose output
we are interested in. It could be the real world data or testing data.
3. It is always good to verify how well the model has been trained. This can be
done using data validation technique. 5-fold cross validation is a technique in
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which we partition the data into 5 equal sized parts. Then we train the model
using 4 partitions except the first part and test it against the first partition.
We repeat this by holding out each of the partitions one by one against the
remaining data [10].
4. Once we are done with validation, we look at the models and select the best
performing approach. Then we estimate the accuracy of the selected approach
using the test data. This the the testing phase. Now, the model is ready to be
deployed and used by applying real-world data to the model.
20
Figure 9: Flowchart for the process
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CHAPTER 5
Results
We considered user data for 94 users, performed masquerade detection for 10
random users with 200 values among all features of each user for all the 94 users in
the training data and in the test data. We also considered features and trained model
for each feature.
We used Regularized Greedy Forest, k-nearest Neighbor, Extreme Gradient
Boosting, Extra Trees to build models for the user dataset and used SVM with linear
kernel, Logistic Regression and Decision Trees for feature dataset.
The results given are the values of Balanced Accuracy and Area Under Curve.
Since our dataset is imbalanced which means that our training and test dataset
have more data labeled with 0 than 1, we chose calculating balanced accuracy over
accuracy. Balanced accuracy is determined when there is unequal distribution in
dependent variable which causes a bias towards the majority class. Most of the
machine learning algorithms assume balanced data [27]. The formula used to calculate
balanced accuracy is
Balanced Accuracy =
1
2
×
(︂
True Positive
Positive
+
True Negative
Negative
)︂
(3)
where True Positive stands for number of samples that have been correctly identified.
True negative stands for all the samples that have been correctly rejected [28].
5.1 Training user based data
We allocated 8 CPUs and 15 GB RAM computational power over the cloud. All
the models have been trained using 5 fold cross validation. The Table 5 describes
information on parameters used for various algorithms during training.
Algorithm Regularized Greedy Forest
Number of Trees/Iterations 50
Area Under Curve 0.999985
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Algorithm Random Forest
Trees/Iterations 5
criterion entropy
Area Under Curve 1
Algorithm k-Nearest Neighbor
neighbors 2
weights uniform
Area Under Curve: 0.96283
Algorithm Logistic Regression
penalty l2
Area Under Curve 0.813436
Algorithm Extreme Gradient Boosting
Trees/Iterations 50
max_depth 3
Area Under Curve 0.976349
Algorithm Decision Trees
Trees/Iterations 5
criterion gini
Area Under Curve 1
Table 5: Values of algorithm parameters while training
Figure 10 shows the AUC values changing over various stages of training using
cross-validation.
Importance of features is obtained from learnt models. Since cross-validation is
used, importance is averaged over all models. The displayed importance is normalized
in such a way that importances obtained with one algorithm from all features sum up
to 100.
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Figure 10: Values of AUC at various stages of training using RF
Figure 11: Graph depicting importance of features
5.2 Testing user based data
The user based data has classes 0 and 1 as labels where 0 indicated other user
and 1 indicated user to be authorized. Testing results for 10 random users using
Regularized Greedy Forest(RGF), Random Forest(RF), K-Nearest Neighbor(KNN),
Extreme Gradient Boosting(EGB) and Decision Trees(DT) have been given in Table 6
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and the respective ROC curves for user1 are shown in Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. The
mean of Balanced Accuracy and AUC values for 94 users is depicted in the form of a
graph in 17. All the other ROC curves are included in the appendix section A. We
also thought it will be useful to experiment with different time frames. So, we tested
data collected over 1 week, 1 month and 3 months against the trained models. The
results of these experiments can be seen in 18.
Figure 12: AUC for Regularized
Greedy Forest with User1 data
Figure 13: AUC for Random Forest
with User1 data
Figure 14: AUC for K-Nearest Neigh-
bor with User1 data
Figure 15: AUC for Extreme Gradient
Boosting with User1 data
User Methods Balanced Accuracy AUC
User1 RGF 99.97% 0.91
RF 79.54% 1
KNN 79.65% 0.86
EGB 99.98% 0.98
DT 100.00% 1
User10 RGF 49.45% 0.50
RF 99.21% 0.99
KNN 96.22% 0.75
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EGB 51.90% 0.52
DT 99.98% 0.99
User11 RGF 49.45% 0.50
RF 99.91% 0.99
KNN 63.75% 0.5
EGB 99.48% 0.52
DT 49.98% 0.53
User79 RGF 70.16% 0.65
RF 80.22% 0.71
KNN 48.25% 0.50
EGB 96.96% 0.98
DT 48.45% 0.50
User55 RGF 52.55% 0.73
RF 99.74% 0.97
KNN 89.25% 0.75
EGB 49.96% 0.52
DT 89.20% 0.63
User48 RGF 94.63% 0.35
RF 99.45% 0.99
KNN 48.45% 0.50
EGB 48.96% 0.52
DT 48.45% 0.50
User22 RGF 24.91% 0.87
RF 45.25% 0.46
KNN 89.35% 0.75
EGB 48.13% 0.49
DT 48.45% 0.50
User92 RGF 48.91% 0.50
RF 99.90% 0.99
KNN 94.40% 0.72
EGB 48.91% 0.50
DT 49.04% 0.56
User81 RGF 60.72% 0.69
RF 60.65% 0.59
KNN 49.88% 0.51
EGB 90.01% 0.74
DT 48.91% 0.50
User36 RGF 37.60% 0.81
RF 99.45% 0.99
KNN 98.82% 0.92
EGB 48.89% 0.50
DT 48.91% 0.50
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Table 6: Test Results for user data
5.3 Training feature based
Figure 19 refers to one of the features model has been trained on. This figure
only depicts the variance of values in the feature dataset. During training, for all the
features Decision tree has been used with split criteria as Gini’s diversity index and
SVM using Linear Kernel. Gini’s index is "the probability that two entities taken at
random from the dataset of interest (with replacement) represent the same type" [29].
Feature Methods Validation Accuracy
Phone Active status LR 89.13%
DT 94.90%
SVM 99%
Apps LR 74.50%
DT 97.90%
SVM 98.90%
cell and area ID LR 71.30%
DT 98.90%
SVM 98.90%
phone charge status LR 86.20%
DT 97.20%
SVM 97.20%
location ID of the person LR 89.20%
DT 97.80%
SVM 97.80%
Description LR 94.30%
DT 98.90%
SVM 98.90%
direction of call LR 85.40%
DT 98.90%
SVM 98.90%
mac of device LR 74.30%
DT 98.90%
SVM 98.90%
Table 7: Test Results for feature data
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Figure 16: AUC for trees with User 1 data
Figure 17: Mean of Balanced Accuracy and AUC values for 94 users
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Figure 18: Graph depicting average Accuracies and AUC’s for userbased data over
different time frames
Figure 19: Range of values for the time all users were active on their phones
5.4 Testing feature based data
Feature data includes feature vectors of 94 users. The results of testing 10
random features using Logistic Regression(LR), Decision Trees(DT) and Support
Vector Machines(SVM) are given in Table 8. Figures 25, 26 depict ROC curves
for Apps feature and Figures A.82, A.83 depict ROC curves for Direction feature.
Figure A.77 and Figure 22 shows the plotting of mean of the charge and location id
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values for all 94 users and standard deviation for each user respectively. A graph
depicting Feature Accuracies using Logistic Regression can be seen in 20.
Feature Methods Balanced Accuracy AUC
Phone Active status LR 48.04% 0.45
DT 48.45% 0.50
SVM 48.45% 0.50
cell and area ID LR 98.13% 0.96
DT 87.92% 0.80
SVM 87.92% 0.80
charge LR 48.45% 0.42
DT 91.50% 0.80
SVM 48.50% 0.50
Description LR 100.00% 0.76
DT 48.50% 0.50
SVM 48.45% 0.50
Direction LR 53.75% 0.91
DT 48.50% 0.50
SVM 48.45% 0.50
Duration LR 50.55% 0.49
DT 48.45% 0.50
SVM 48.45% 0.50
Device_list_macs LR 40.13% 0.30
DT 48.92% 0.50
SVM 48.92% 0.50
Apps LR 97.30% 0.96
DT 95.91% 0.80
SVM 95.91% 0.80
loc_ids LR 30.41% 0.39
DT 48.45% 0.50
SVM 48.45% 0.50
Table 8: Test Results for feature data
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Figure 20: Graph depicting Feature Accuracies using Logistic Regression
Figure 21: Variance between values of
the Charge feature for all users
Figure 22: Variance between values of
the loc_ids feature for all users
Figure 23: AUC for Direction feature
using SVM
Figure 24: AUC for Direction feature
using LR
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Figure 25: AUC for apps feature using
SVM
Figure 26: AUC for apps feature using
LR
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
We considered 31 features for 94 users, trained and tested them using several
machine learning algorithms. We performed this experiment for 10 random users. We
also trained models for 10 features. We see that the features charge, communication
data and location features have been efficient in detecting the authorized user. Using all
the 31 features for all the users, Random forests algorithm has performed comparatively
well.
• In future, one could try Bayesian classification to build a model. Train and Test
data can include various classes and you can predict probabilities of the test
data being any of the users. Finally, one could pick the highest probability as
the particular user to be authenticated.
• One could include more features and improve feature engineering. There are
several features that we have not considered from the MIT dataset which can
be included. Most of the features we left out were the ones with less data per
user but it would be reasonable to combine the features and work on them.
• You can also apply Spiking neural networks on a few features that have been
collected over a time period with time series data example charge, logs, etc.
The section for Spiking Neural Networks in [30] specifies that ‘‘SNNs have an
advantage of being able to process information in the time domain (signals that
vary over time)’’. You can refer to this tool for doing that [31].It is a package
available in python, it is a simulator for Spiking Neural Networks.
• We concentrated on the authentication problem and focused on one user at a
time. A future work would be to perform well in identifying each of the users
based on their behavior.
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APPENDIX
Results
A.1 ROC curves for User data
A.1.1 User10 Results
Figure A.27: AUC for Regularized
Greedy Forest with User10 data
Figure A.28: AUC for Random Forest
with User10 data
Figure A.29: AUC for Extreme Gradi-
ent Boosting with User10 data
Figure A.30: AUC for trees with User
10 data
Figure A.31: AUC for K-Nearest Neighbor with User10 data
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A.1.2 User11 Results
Figure A.32: AUC for Regularized
Greedy Forest with User11 data
Figure A.33: AUC for Random Forest
with User11 data
Figure A.34: AUC for Extreme Gradi-
ent Boosting with User11 data
Figure A.35: AUC for trees with User
11 data
Figure A.36: AUC for K-Nearest Neighbor with User11 data
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A.1.3 User79 Results
Figure A.37: AUC for Regularized
Greedy Forest with User79 data
Figure A.38: AUC for Random Forest
with User79 data
Figure A.39: AUC for K-Nearest
Neighbor with User79 data
Figure A.40: AUC for trees with User
79 data
Figure A.41: AUC for Extreme Gradient Boosting with User79 data
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A.1.4 User55 Results
Figure A.42: AUC for Regularized
Greedy Forest with User55 data
Figure A.43: AUC for Random Forest
with User55 data
Figure A.44: AUC for K-Nearest
Neighbor with User55 data
Figure A.45: AUC for Extreme Gradi-
ent Boosting with User55 data
Figure A.46: AUC for trees with User55 data
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A.1.5 User48 Results
Figure A.47: AUC for Regularized
Greedy Forest with User48 data
Figure A.48: AUC for Random Forest
with User48 data
Figure A.49: AUC for K-Nearest
Neighbor with User48 data
Figure A.50: AUC for Extreme Gradi-
ent Boosting with User48 data
Figure A.51: AUC for trees with User48 data
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A.1.6 User22 Results
Figure A.52: AUC for RGF with
User22 data
Figure A.53: AUC for RF with User22
data
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A.1.7 User48 Results
Figure A.54: AUC for KNN with
User22 data
Figure A.55: AUC for EGB with
User22 data
Figure A.56: AUC for Trees with User22 data
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A.1.8 User92 Results
Figure A.57: AUC for RGF with
User92 data
Figure A.58: AUC for RF with User92
data
Figure A.59: AUC for KNN with
User92 data
Figure A.60: AUC for EGB with
User92 data
Figure A.61: AUC for Trees with User92 data
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A.1.9 User81 Results
Figure A.62: AUC for RGF with
User81 data
Figure A.63: AUC for RF with User81
data
Figure A.64: AUC for EGB with
User81 data
Figure A.65: AUC for Trees with
User81 data
Figure A.66: AUC for KNN with User81 data
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A.1.10 User36 Results
Figure A.67: AUC for RGF with
User36 data
Figure A.68: AUC for RF with User36
data
Figure A.69: AUC for KNN with
User36 data
Figure A.70: AUC for EGB with
User36 data
Figure A.71: AUC for Trees with User36 data
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A.2 ROC curves for User data
Figure A.72: AUC for Active feature
using LR
Figure A.73: AUC for Active feature
using SVM
Figure A.74: AUC for CellAreaID fea-
ture using LR
Figure A.75: AUC for CellAreaID fea-
ture using SVM
Figure A.76: Variance between values
of the CellAreaID feature for all users
[htb]
Figure A.77: Variance between values
of the Charge feature for all users
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Figure A.78: AUC for Charge feature
using SVM
Figure A.79: AUC for Charge feature
using LR
Figure A.80: AUC for Description fea-
ture using SVM
Figure A.81: AUC for Description us-
ing LR
Figure A.82: AUC for Direction feature
using SVM
Figure A.83: AUC for Duration feature
using LR
49
Figure A.84: AUC for Device_list_macs feature using LR
Figure A.85: AUC for loc_ids feature
using LR
Figure A.86: AUC for loc_ids feature
using SVM
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A.3 Important features
Figure A.87: Values of AUC at various stages of training using EGB
Figure A.88: Graph depicting importance of features
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Figure A.89: Graph depicting importance of features
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